Last time I mentioned that Brentano was developing a “science of consciousness” and promised I would explain. Brentano’s claim that the true method of philosophy would be that of the natural sciences was not a throwaway remark or provocative soundbite, but seriously meant as the starting point of an encompassing research program and as a core tenet of his school. Given his distinction between internal and external perception, you might think that this would then lead to a strict distinction between the natural sciences and the mental ones, the Natur– and the Geisteswissenschaften. However, I also mentioned in my first post that Brentano had petitioned the Austrian government for funding for a psychological laboratory to do experimental research. So which kind of perception is involved in psychology? Is his science of consciousness a natural science or not? How should we investigate the mind and consciousness?
This is still an open problem and it would be great if an analysis of Brentano’s approach could contribute something to current debates. So what are the current requirements for a “science of consciousness”?
The task [. . . ] is to systematically integrate two key classes of data into a scientific framework: third-person data, or data about behavior and brain processes, and first-person data, or data about subjective experience. When a conscious system is observed from the third-person point of view, a range of specific behavioral and neural phenomena present themselves. When a conscious system is observed from the first-person point of view, a range of specific subjective phenomena present themselves. Both sorts of phenomena have the status of data for a science of consciousness. (Chalmers 2010, 37 )
Precisely such a programme was already formulated by Brentano, who recognized that internal perception itself is quite limited in scope and that external perception can and should also contribute data to psychology. He distinguished descriptive and genetic psychology: the former would trace “the first mental phenomena [=sensations] that arise through physical stimuli” while the latter would inquire into the “immediate physical causes of sensation” (Brentano 1874, 8). He explicitly acknowledged sources of data about mental phenomena beyond subjective reflection, opening up the framework to both first- and third-person methodologies: “the facts considered by the physiologist and those by the psychologist, stand in the closest relation of mutual exchange, despite all their differences in character. […] And not only are physical states elicited by physical ones, and mental by mental ones, but also do physical states have mental ones, and mental states physical ones as consequences” (8).
This is entirely in line with his methodological unity of the sciences. Besides the common method, the science of psychical phenomena and the sciences of physical phenomena also share their starting point: “the foundations of psychology as well as of the natural sciences are perception and experience” (35.) Specifically, the starting point of psychology lies in the study of sensations, which are a source for other psychical phenomena, and “according to many” the only source. In parallel, sensations also form the starting point for natural science, which “does not deal with all physical phenomena; not with those of phantasy, but only with those that appear in the sensation. And also regarding these, it only establishes laws in so far as they depend on the physical stimulation of the sense organs” (127). From the common starting point of our sensations we can proceed inductively in both directions, outward and inward, in finding the laws of coexistence and succession of all phenomena (for more detail on how physical phenomena serve as signs for external causes, see Ierna 2012; and for more detail on intentionality and (im)proper presentations Ierna 2015 (link to PDF of final draft)).
Moreover, internal perception is limited to our own experiences. Brentano claims that, while we have no direct access to the mental phenomena of others, we have some indirect knowledge of them insofar as they express their inner mental life, both voluntarily as well as involuntarily. The best way of finding out about the mental life of others, is when they express it in words, in spoken or written form, including forms such as autobiographies, since he considered that the general purpose of language was to express the content of our mental phenomena. In historical perspective, language itself is a cultural sediment of how people have put their mental life in words, providing a preliminary classification of mental phenomena (48). Similarly history can provide insights in the mental life of the masses, averaging out individual particularities (53). Additionally, internal perception can be complemented by investigations into simpler minds, such as those of children and animals (49). Though we cannot accurately remember the very first stirrings of our own mental life in their purest forms, observation of newborns provide some clues (57).
Hence we see that for Brentano psychology is not a solipsistic or introspectionist endeavor. Instead psychology is connected in many ways to other scientific domains and does not rely exclusively on the internal perception of a single subject. Not only does it stand in productive exchange with the natural sciences, from physics to physiology, but also the humanities. Indeed, Brentano would claim that psychology can inform all the other sciences, since it analyses the root of all experience: sensation. Hence, I would argue that Brentano provides a strikingly contemporary framework for performing research in such a science of consciousness, indicating how psychology can profit from and inform physiology, integrating data from both the first- and third-person perspective, and yet still remain an autonomous discipline. Moreover, far from remaining an impractical vision of how things might ideally be done, Brentano’s project was in fact taken up by his students who actually did succeed in founding laboratories, conducting experiments, and inspiring a further generation of researchers, whose success almost eclipsed them as they had eclipsed Brentano.
So, does Brentano offer us a meaningful science of consciousness that could still be relevant today? Can we consider the interdisciplinary approach in the School of Brentano as “cognitive science” avant la lettre? How did they deal with the hard problem of consciousness and the progressive mechanization of mind in the 19th century?
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