I'd like to dwell a bit more on the conversation that started in the comments section of my post on publishing secrets about our professional obligations. I stated in the post that I don't see any grounds for thinking we have professional obligation to not "clog up the system" with second-rate papers (i.e. papers that might not be publishable). Dan Dennis then pressed me on this, asking whether it's equivalent to littering or not paying one's taxes, which I agree are both wrong.
I'm curious what everyone else thinks about this. I am still inclined to doubt that we have a duty not to "clog up the system with second-rate papers" on a couple of grounds. One ground is epistemic. I don't think one can necessarily tell in advance — before submitting it — whether a paper is second-rate. I am relatively confident that some people would say that some of the papers I've published are second-rate, but I don't think they're second rate. Further, I don't think I have a moral duty to tailor my judgment about what's second-rate to how others judge it. Why? Because, as I've mentioned several times before, I have a bit of an idiosyncratic — though I think justified — view of what good philosophy is. In other words, what many people think is great I think is second-rate, and what they think is second-rate I sometimes think is great.
More generally, I think that even when people have less idiosyncratic view about philosophy than do I, it's still permissible for them to decide for themselves whether a piece is "second-rate" befor they send it out. I'm happy to agree that it's wrong to send out a piece one believes to be second-rate, but I'd be surprised if people ever do this. Once I think something is genuinely second-rate, I don't send it out. This, then, is the first reason why I don't think we have a duty to avoid clogging up the review system with second-rate papers. If the expectation is that we judge second-rated-ness in terms of how others judge our papers, I think it is too strong: each person has the right to judge for themselves whether a given paper is second-rate. On the other hand, if the expectation is that we don't send out papers we think are second-rate ourselves, then I'm happy to accept the obligation but think it's practically vacuous, since I doubt people tend to send out papers they think are second rate. (But maybe I'm wrong about this?)
Here's another worry I have. The entire publishing review system is, in my view, profoundly unfair. I think there is all kinds of evidence for this — for instance, (a) evidence that reviewers often behave unethically by "Google reviewing" papers (which almost certainly harms people at less-prestigious institutions), (b) irresponsible reviews in general (ones where the reviewer plainly didn't read the paper conscientiously), etc. This raises the question: what is a morally permissible way to respond to an unjust system?
Dan Dennis' remarks suggest something like a duty of fair play. This is what his littering and non-taxpaying cases suggest (it's wrong to litter and not pay taxes while others do). However, I, following Rawls, think that a duty of fair play is only triggered against fair background conditions. And I don't think there's anything remotely close to fair background conditions here. First, I think many others aren't doing their fair share (I've personally had to review a good deal of papers I think are second-rate). Second, I think the entire review system is unfair (for reasons given above). Why think we have a duty to "do our fair share" in a system that is deeply unfair?
The only thing I can really think of here is a kind of virtue-theoretic argument? Such an argument seems suggested by Elisa Freschi's pointed response to my reply to Dan in that thread:
Marcus, after your last comment (answering to Dan), I am puzzled. Did not you advocate stronger links between adjuncts, so that they are not exploited? Don't you dedicate time and energy to collective enterprises such as this blog, which is by the way meant to support young philosophers, although they might one day be your competitors? Why do you now speak as if you were just coming out of Hobbes' Leviathan?
Elisa's thought seems to be roughly, "Don't you try to be a good person — one who cares for treating others well? How is being that kind of person consistent with your Hobbesian reasoning here?" Because I really do try to be a good person and recognize that I don't always succeed (who's perfect?), I take Elisa's worry deeply. But I am still inclined to give the response I gave in the thread. In conceiving myself as a good person, I am torn. I recognize that a good person shouldn't want to burden his/her professional colleagues with second-rate papers. I also recognize, however — again, trying to be a good person — that I have a duty to my wife (and, I think, to myself) to do my best to be successful in this very difficult, competitive discipline. If I never find a permanent job, I probably not only consign myself to prolonged misery; it would harm my family. So, what is a good person to do? I still think: if one has to choose (and I'm inclined to think one sometimes must), a good person prioritizes the long-term good of their family over imposing unfortunate inconveniences on professional colleagues.
This, at any rate, is where I am coming from. I don't take the issue lightly. Far from it, I really do want to do the right thing — and so I'm happy, as always, to listen and change my mind in light of further discussion.
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