No, if you uphold an interpersonal view of testimony, in which the speaker-hearer relation plays a major role, for instance, insofar as the speaker has to take responsibility (so Richard Moran) for what she says to a specific speaker. Whenever such responsibility is not taken (for instance, in soliloques), one cannot trust the speaker's words.
However, a drunken man's soliloque is perhaps not invalidated as a case of testimony by the fact that I only overheard it, but rather by other invalidating factors (e.g., drunkness and unreliability of the speaker).
Similarly, if there is no other invalidating factor, I would not rule out from testimony more plain cases of overhearing such as X tells Y that z and I overhear it, provided that X is a reliable speaker (however we define one), z is true (however we define it), I satisfy the minimal criteria to be a reliable hearer (however we define them). The only further condition I would add is that X should be a reliable speaker in regard to Y.
For instance, if you overhear me speaking about Sanskrit with X, for whom I have a romantic interest, you can come to know that Sanskrit prema means 'love' only if:
—prema does in fact mean 'love'
—I am a reliable speaker
—you know that I know Sanskrit, have enough background knowledge, no defeaters, etc. (i.e., you are a competent hearer)
—I am not just showing off because I like X
More generally, the point is that the upholders of the intersubjective view of testimony may be right in claiming that intersubjective relations play a role in testimony, insofar as one is not a reliable speaker abstractly, but rather in reference to a specific content and to a specific hearer. Unless we want only to admit among reliable speakers superhuman beings who would never lie, not even with their children or parents…
(This post has been stimulated by some interesting comments to this one. Thus, many thanks to Rachel and Ben A.)
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