The Philosophers' Cocoon

Just as a goal of believing only the truth, if not tempered by other goals, could lead to believing very little, so a rigorous determination to allow only true testimony could lead to allowing very little testimony. But we don't want people to withhold too much potetially useful testimony.

(Steven Reynolds, "Testimony, Knowledge and Epistemic Goals", 2002, p. 149, my emphasis).

Although Reynolds' article focusses on other topics, this incidental passage seems to me to address a very well-taken point. If our criteria for testimony become too strict, we run the risk of making people withdraw too much information because (a) they are not completely justified in believing it, (b) are not morally adequate for testifying it (e.g., because they have some interest in the issue), etc. etc.

Wait, you might object, we as philosophers do not tell people what they have to do and people will keep on testifying that p irrespective of what the testimonial norms should be according to epistemologists of testimony. This might be true (see this post by Eric Schwitgebel on ethicists who are not more ethical than "normal" people), but

1. Do we want it to be true? In other words, do we want philosophical reflections to be irrelevant to actual practices?
2. Suppose that we agree that philosophy is, like modern grammars, not prescriptive but merely descriptive: Why should then the requisites for testimony be so much higher than the ones commonly agreed upon in everyday life?
3. Alternatively, does the epistemology of testimony only aim at depicting an ideal state (i.e., the way testimony should work in an epistemologically ideal world), which we do not want to be realised on earth (i.e., is the epistemology of testimony just like painting an ideal landscape)?

In other words, what do we aim at when we investigate on the epistemology (of testimony)?

For my previous discussions on the (too) strict criteria for testimony, see this post and this one.

On the topic of the consistency between what one researches and one's life you might enjoy this post by Amod Lele (also inspired by Eric Schwitgebel's study).

For some thoughts of mine on the fundamental importance of testimonially acquired knowledge, see this post. If, by the way, you are curious about views on Testimony in Indian thought, check the label "Epistemology of Testimony" in my new blog or the label "śabda" in my old one).