A recent post by Elisabeth Barnes raised a discussion in several blogs (including this one) about philosophy’s “casual cruelty”. Philosophers, it is said, argue about basic human rights in an abstract way, with thought experiments daring to ask whether it would be ethical to let die disabled children/abort disabled foetuses/prohibit disabled people to have children/… . Philosophers do not even stop speculating about the suppression of disabled people, Barnes continues, when they have a real disabled person in front of them.

This reminds me of Richard Rorty’s discussion of the value of literature. Literature, Rorty argued, makes one identify with single persons, and not just with humankind in general. One sees Lolita’s perspective and Humbert’s one and one cannot fully condemn in a crude, rationalising way, because one sees the human side of the story.

In this view, I look forward for Marco Lauri‘s presentation at our panel on Testimony at the Atiner Conference (here is the program), since he will focus on the epistemological value of story telling. Story telling is not just the frame, it alters the meaning of the content communicated, it adds shades of meaning and depth to the content communicated —so that the listener’s belief or lack thereof in the content presented is intrinsically dependent on the story in which it is embedded (think of the Cretan paradox as the utterance of a repented lier and it is no longer a paradox).

Story telling can even have a transformative value, insofar as it changes the listener (and perhaps through her also the speaker). Thus, the ideal situation of a listener, a speaker and a content is possibly much more muddled in actual reality and the three can be reciprocally linked. However, let me add that the investigation of this hermeneutic circle does not need to lie outside the precinct of philosophy (although it has often lain outside analytic philosophy), as shown by Ancient Greek (Plato —see Mark Hopwood’s comment on this blog—, Aristotle’s attention to poetical structures) and Arabic philosophy (Lauri will refer to Ibn Ṭufayl), by the fact that Rorty and Gadamer were also philosophers, by the usage of poetry and story telling in the works of well-known philosophers such as Derrida, Nietzsche (and Veṅkaṭanātha).

You can read a great post on philosophy and poetry (especially in Indian Philosophy) here. The same author (Andrew Ollett) dwells further on the issue here. (cross-posted —with minor modifications— on my personal blog)

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7 responses to “Philosophy’s crudity and Narrative’s epistemological value”

  1. Hi Elisa: I think this is a very important issue. Moral philosophers have a habit of focusing on hypothetical thought-experiments that they think isolate ‘morally relevant features’ of a situation, but which in fact abstract away from emotional and narrative facts that are morally relevant. The result, all too often, is moral philosophy that is emotionally and interpersonally–and yes, morally–stunted (look no further than the Stoics, Plato’s Socrates, etc.).
    Moral philosophy should be engaged with real life, not abstract away from it–and stories can help us do it. I long for a return to the kind of philosophy I associate with people like Stanley Cavell–philosophy that works with art, poetry, and literature in examining how we should live rather than ignoring them.

  2. Thank you, Marcus. I am a strong believer in the epistemological value of stories as instances of linguistic communication as an instrument of knowledge and I cannot but encourage the philosophical investigation of literature and poetry. However, and just because of my absurd tendency to always take the role of the advocatus diaboli, I wonder whether we should not be proud of the openness of philosophy and of its ability to ask all questions and not just the ones which are “appropriate”. In other words, I am very much in favour of the pars construens of the argument, but sligtly less convinced by its pars destruens.

  3. Sean Whitton

    Could you point me at Rorty’s discussion of the value of literature, please? Thanks in advance.

  4. Sean: It is in the last chapter of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity.

  5. Sean Whitton

    Thanks for that 🙂

  6. Expat Grad

    This is an interesting post, and realize that I’m picking nits, but I don’t think you’re right about the Liar.
    If the narrative is that Epimenides the Cretan has reformed from his Cretonism (pathological lying), and says “All Cretans are liars”, presumably, because he is reformed, he is telling the truth. However, he hasn’t ceased to be a Cretan, thus he is lying. To be sure, this doesn’t have the same force as the original paradox, but Epimendides is still lying and telling the truth, which, outside of Australasia at least, is paradoxical.

  7. Expat Grad, I see your point and I also see that I have been too terse. What I meant was an example I am drawing from Emilio Garroni (http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emilio_Garroni) who once explained that any paradox comparable to the Liar’s one is never really found in an epistemological vacuum. What would rather happen is that someone will dramatize the sentence and put it in an appropriate context, e.g. “As a Cretan, I cannot stop lying, but I regret it, I hate myself for it…”. The explicitation of the possible implicatures seems to change the paradoxical-ness of the paradox, whereas its pure logical form is just not solvable.

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