I've been thinking the past few days about a twitter exchange I encountered this past weekend. Basically, a philosopher I don't know was conversing with a philosopher I do know about the work of Avner Baz, someone whose work I have featured here before. Basically, the philosopher I don't know asked if anyone has actually engaged with Baz's work, as he considers Baz's work quite good. The philosopher I know then basically replied that, no, basically everyone has ignored Baz's work, including Timothy Williamson, whose work Baz specifically targets.

Anyway, today I took a look at Baz's citation record on Google Scholar and found that my friend is basically right. For instance, Baz's 2012 book, When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy (Harvard University Press), has been all but ignored by philosophers (mainly getting cited by less than a couple of dozen people outside of philosophy)–this despite the facts that it (A) challenges an entire philosophical method (the so-called method of cases) that has been absolutely central to analytic philosophy over the past several decades, and (B) has received absolutely glowing reviews at NDPR and elsewhere, the former of which concluded that, "Baz…pushes the doors wide open for another fresh start in philosophical investigations." Similarly, Baz's 2012 article in The Journal of Philosophy (!), 'Must Philosophers Rely on Intuitions?', despite appearing in one of the most preeminent journals in our field, has been cited all of 5 times in the nearly three years since its publication, three of which were self-citations (Baz referring later to his own paper). 

So here's the thing. It's not as though Baz has published bad work in completely out of the way places. He was published in top-ranked journals and had a wonderfully well-reviewed book come out in a good press. Not only that: his work challenges basic methodologies that just about everyone in our field uses and has relied on for decades (which I also raised serious concerns about here, here, and here). All of this…and nothing. No responses, no refutations, no developments. Nothing. Just about no one–particularly not the famous figures whose work he critiques–appears to have paid a lick of attention. You would at least expect, if the work were bad or wrong, there would be something: responses, refutations, whatever. But this is precisely what hasn't happened. Nothing has happened.

From my perspective, Baz is far from along in this regard.  Time and again I see what–by my lights, at least–are good papers and arguments that are perpetually ignored, and bad arguments treated with great reverence. Which brings me back to my concerns about the sociology of philosophy. Does academic philosophy really tend to move forward as a result of good arguments winning the day and conscientious engagement with arguments that challenge orthodoxies? Or, does it largely progress as a result of sociological factors having little to do with good philosophy? For my part, I continue to worry. But what do I know? Am I the only one who has these worries? I leave it for you to think about and discuss.

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14 responses to “What does it take to get a drink in this place? The sociology of philosophy (again)”

  1. Lee Walters

    Hi Marcus,
    A few points:
    1) 2012 is not that long ago, and it takes time for work to have an impact in terms of citations. And one might think that the deeper the work, the longer takes.
    2) The fact that your twitter friend and JPhil thought Baz’s work good, does not mean that it is – by your own lights, this is not a sure sign of good work.
    3) Quickly skimming Nat Hansen’s review, I did not get the impression that it was glowing.
    4) From the brief glimpse into Baz’s project afforded by Hansen’s review, it seemed to me that he has made some fundamental mistakes. Now I’m not claiming that he has in fact done so – I’m not in a position to judge on the basis of a two-page summary. But given that that is my impression, I personally wouldn’t be inclined to read his book given my limited time. Perhaps, others feel likewise?
    5) No doubt many philosophers criticise well known philosophers such as Williamson, but do we really expect such philosophers to reply to all their critics?
    6) You claim, that no one has paid any attention to Baz’s work. But perhaps they have, and found it not worth bothering with (this is not my position – I’m not in a position to make an informed judgement, but it is a possibility).
    7) Perhaps 5 citations is above average for a paper in JPhil after 3 years? Without some comparative data, it is difficult to make anything of the facts you report.
    8) I do not want to dispute one of the main thrusts of this post, that often times good work gets overlooked, at least initially. But we all accept that anyway – think of Frege and Williamson’s early work. And I do not want to dispute that some good work gets completely marginalized. But it is really not clear what lessons can be learned from this particular case.

  2. Marcus Arvan

    Hi Lee: Thanks for your comment. All good questions. I think my sense on why this case is instructive comes from several things: (A) my own judgment that Baz’s work is very good, (B) my sense that the methods he is criticizing are problematic in more or less the way he argues (and for more reasons I am working on in my own research), (C) my sense that a lot of other not-very-good articles from 2012-on have received a ton of discussion and citations, and finally (D) my general sense that there is a lot of good work getting ignored.
    I could certainly be wrong on all of thes counts–but this is precisely why I ended with a series of questions asking how many people feel the same way. I get a clear sense from some of my friends that they share my concerns, but of course it could be that we are friends because we share similar philosophical outlooks (and biases?). Anyway, you do raise good questions. I look forward to hearing what others think!

  3. Hi Marcus–I agree that Baz’s work is interesting. If you’re interested, I try to give an account of what’s going on in his central arguments in §3 of this survey of contemporary ordinary language philosophy:
    https://www.academia.edu/6628214/Contemporary_Ordinary_Language_Philosophy

  4. Lee Walters

    Thanks Marcus.
    As I said, I’m not in a position to judge (A), although you and I have disagreed about (B) in the past I think. I am, however, prepared to concede that I could be wrong and that your methodological qualms might be right. And perhaps you have the same epistemic humility?
    I certainly agree with (C) and (D)! But sometimes these things take time. And I do think reputation can be unhelpful sometimes, but not always.

  5. Marcus Arvan

    Thanks, Lee. As an aside, I find Baz’s negative arguments against dominant philosophical methods (the method of cases) far better than his positive arguments for a return to ordinary language philosophy (an approach to philosophy which I also think is horribly mistaken). I have a paper of my own in the works where I try to offer what I take to be a much better alternative than a return to OLP–but who knows if it will ever come out! 😉

  6. One small thing. I have a hard time getting my hands on JPhil articles and so I’m guilty of not checking it as often as I should. Having said that, I should look at that article on intuitions.

  7. Marcus Arvan

    Nat: Thanks for your comment, and for drawing attention to your piece. As luck would have it, your summary clarifies something critical about Baz for my own project–his distinction between (1) knowledge ascriptions always having a “point” in ordinary language whereas (2) the theorist’s question has no such “point” (beyond the supposed aim of elucidating “knowledge”). As you note in your piece, there are various ways to resist Baz’s arguments so far on precisely this point–but it’s also a point that I’m trying to give a new, independent defense of in my own work (a parallel between my work and Baz’s that I hadn’t realized). I’ll be sure to reference your piece and Baz’s in my next set of revisions. 🙂

  8. Marcus: Sounds good!

  9. Thanks for continuing to beat the drum on this, Marcus. I spend a bit of time doing work in Classics in addition to Philosophy, and I’m continually appalled by how poorly our discipline compares to others when it comes to responsible research practices. I don’t know anything about Baz’s work (not even close to my area), but I know this is a problem everywhere.

  10. Brad Cokelet

    Hi Macus,
    Could part of the issue be the radical nature of Baz’s views? He is, so to speak, to the left of Travis and Michael Williams! Their arguments and views do get discussed so perhaps his being to the left of them explains some of the neglect.
    I guess I would expect people like that (the people he calls contextualists) to respond to him before more mainstream people would, and this does not obviously reflect badly on the profession. One can’t read everything and if one opposes some other camp one might wait to hear people in that camp reach consensus on who makes the best case for it and then focus reading resources on that book or discussion. The idea would be that if various pragmatically inclined philosophers start agreeing that Baz’s view is one to read along side Travis, Williams, etc, then defenders of orthodoxy will start to wade in?
    Just a thought.

  11. Marcus Arvan

    Hi Brad: I expect that may be a part of it, but if so it is yet another illustration of philosophy’s unfortunate methodological conservatism. In the sciences (such as physics and psychology), controverisial new findings and theories–whether they are published in top-ranked or lower-ranked journals–appear on the whole to be immediately engaged with–with a kind of glee in fact: people interested in expanding upon the new idea, refuting it, and so on. Philosophy, by my lights, is incredibly different.

  12. S.T.

    This kind of thing makes me wonder about that popular question about whether or not there is progress in philosophy. Is philosophy getting better? Or people doing “more good” philosophy now than they were 20, 30, 50 years ago? Or, do we simply have some arbitrarily selected scheme by which we judge that “good” from “bad” philosophy that, as arbitrary, is bullshit. Is any one really going to tell me they can intuit valuable differences in quality between the paper on, whatever, the epistemology of testimony that gets into Phil review vs the same paper that gets into some “lower” “ranked” journal? Please.

  13. Brad Cokelet

    Hi Marcus,
    Interesting. I have had psychologists complain to me that in their field there is great pressure to represent yourself as breaking new ground and not build on previous models (use other people’s measures, “constructs”, etc). People jumping on new fads all over the place is not necessarily better than people slowly and reluctantly changing research programs. Maybe that is not how psychology operates, but I think we should be careful to make sweeping comparative judgements here.
    I also wonder how much we really know about how the sciences in question select ideas for future development. I remember reading David Hull’s book (Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science) and wonder whether it give us a framework for thinking more realistically about how to make philosophy better.

  14. Jessica Wilson

    Hi Marcus, thanks for raising this issue to attention. Here’s a link to my followup: https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=682920565184925&id=100004009643564&pnref=story

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