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What counts as philosophy? On the normative disguised as descriptive UPDATED

As a scholar of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā I am well aware of how the normative is often disguised as descriptive. “It is seven o’ clock” says the mother, but what she means is rather “Get up! You have to go to school”.

 

Similarly, complex discourses about the nature of philosophy, how it was born, e.g., in Greece or in Plato’s Republic, and how it developed in (Latin), German, (French) and English, are only meant to say “We are not going to welcome colleagues working on things we do not care for in our departments”. Why so? Because as soon as one tries to reason with the authors of the allegedly descriptive statements (as done here by Ethan Mills and here by Amod Lele), one gets answers such as “the universality of philosophy”, “the primacy of logical argumentation”, “the importance of debate”, “the supremacy of reason over tradition” etc. All of them can be easily found at least in some Indian schools.

I am not saying that they are not found in African, Chinese, Mesoamerican philosophy, I am just saying that no matter how restrictive your definition of philosophy, Navya Nyāya, etc., will fit in. Conversely, Thomas the Aquinas, Augustine, Nietzsche etc. will end up being excluded by such definitions. Thus, the argument is in fact overtly not descriptive.

Does it mean that we should try to make philosophers accept at least Navya Nyāya etc? Or should we rather uncover the normativity of the discourse and call for a broader definition of the enterprise of philosophy?

An insightful discussion of the same issue, with extensive quotes and critical reflections about them can be read in Malcolm Keating’s blog, here.

Eric Schwitzgebel offers further interesting reflections on the issue in his blog (be sure to check the comments and his accurate replies to the “ignorance justifying ignorance” argument, as well as the labels for the “not really philosophy” and “low quality” arguments).

UPDATE: “Prof Manners” has an interesting post here explaining that articles trying to say that Confucius is not “philosophical” because philosophy is x, y, z in fact only list “generally desirable and admiration-worthy qualities”.

 

(cross-posted on my personal blog, where you can read also some interesting comments regarding the inclusion (or lack thereof) of Islamic philosophy, and on the Indian Philosophy blog, where you can read some comments regarding the organisation of philosophy institutes.)

 

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3 responses to “What counts as philosophy? On the normative disguised as descriptive UPDATED”

  1. Rob

    Take the first option: Persuade philosophers that historical non-Western figures used philosophical methods and thus count as philosophers.
    If you want these figures to be regularly taught, you will also need to persuade colleagues in the profession that these figures’ work is philosophically important in some way. Did they produce sound arguments for interesting conclusions? Did they produce unsound arguments that nonetheless contain important insights or that fail in intellectually illuminating ways? Did they influence later debates in ways it is valuable for students to know about?
    The second option, expanding the definition of the enterprise of philosophy, is bad. Philosophy has distinctive methods of pursuing knowledge. It is important both for the intellectual integrity of our work and for the institutional survival of our discipline to recognize that philosophy has distinctive methods of inquiry.

    Reply
  2. Elisa Freschi

    Thanks, Rob, also because you are the first among the ones who replied me who actually engages with my question.
    I see your point and this is more or less what I have been doing until now. In fact, this is also what scholars like Peter Adamson, J. Ganeri, B.K. Matilal, E. Thompson, C. Coseru, M. Siderits, J.N. Mohanty, and so on… have been doing. All of them (of us, si parva licet componere magnis) have been showing (in a compelling way, I would say) that philosophers such as Kumārila produced sound arguments and interesting conclusions (e.g., on the topic of the epistemology of linguistic communication). This makes me think that the lack of consideration is more an a priori than something due to the actual fact that scholars have failed to show that all that you say applies.
    Then there is the second problem: Suppose I manage to convince logicians that they really cannot think about logic without taking into account Dharmakīrti’s theory of syllogism. If they would accept him and then shut the door to any other, not so much would have been gained for the discipline, who would continue to neglect important contributions.
    This being said, I am not a political activist and I personally believe in the power of incremental change. I will thus continue to try hard (but will not forget that resistances might be more psychological/sociological/political than intellectually motivated).

    Reply
  3. elisa freschi

    A comparative philosopher sent me this comment:
    “Well, what you say: ‘Or should we rather uncover the normativity of the discourse and call for a broader definition of the enterprise of philosophy?’ is what I think our job as cross-cultural philosophers is.
    Unfortunately, for large stretches of time, many of us our caught up emulating what the mainstream understanding of philosophy tells us to do.”

    Reply

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