There was a brief discussion at Leiter reports earlier this week about writing samples for grad school admission, and one issue that came up was whether an applicant's writing sample should match their philosophical interests. An anonymous applicant wrote in:
I'm a prospective philosophy PhD applicant preparing my applications, and I just have two questions about the writing sample that I hope you and/or readers of your blog could illuminate on.
1) There seems to be conflicting suggestions as to whether the writing sample(s) should match the applicant's interests. I wonder which suggestion is right.
On the one hand, Richard Heck writes on Brown University philosophy department's website: "the writing sample does not have to be connected, in any way, with the area or areas you think you most want to pursue in graduate school." (https://www.brown.edu/academics/philosophy/application-advice)
On the other hand, Paul Weirich commented in a post on your blog: "The writing sample, besides demonstrating qualifications, shows whether the student's interests fit the department well." (http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2010/10/ma-students-and-phd-applications.html)
In the comments section, Tim O'Keefe shared the following reflections:
It's far better to have a writing sample that demonstrates an applicant's ability to do good work related to one of their self-declared areas of interest rather than something out of area. Having something out of area isn't automatically disqualifying–after all, it can show that you're capable of doing good philosophical work in general, and people often switch their AOIs after entering a program. But programs are usually looking to balance their grad student body based on their interests and fit with the program, and if you're pitching yourself to us as a 'philosophy of mind' person, it will raise eyebrows if you've got a paper on Anselm's Ontological Argument.
David Chalmers then added:
the admissions process works differently at different places, but one common route to admission is to have strong support from a faculty member in your area who is enthusiastic about working with you…that said, it's common for admissions committee (including NYU) to put much more weight on strength of writing sample than on area of interest (partly because areas can change), and it's quite common to be admitted in virtue of a strong writing sample regardless of area. so all in all, i'd agree with tim that other things being equal it's certainly better to have a writing sample close to the area of declared interest, but if your best work by far is in an different area, you may do better to use that work.
While I think it is natural for admissions committees to take into account applicants' interests–and I also understand why they might do so (viz. O'Keefe's point about "fit" with the program and Chalmers' points about enthusiasm for what a candidate is working on), I want to raise two concerns about applicants' interests playing a significant role in admissions that, as far as I can tell, are rarely discussed.
My first concern is that taking candidates' interests into account might inadvertently favor candidates from elite backgrounds or demographics. In his post a while back, "Sorry, Cal State Students, No Princeton Grad School for You!", Eric Schwitzgebel posted the results of a study he performed showing a strong preference in philosophy grad admissions for candidates from elite schools. While Schwitgebel stops short of inferring unfairness, it is generally worth being on guard against ways that grad school admissions might be unfair. How might this be the case here? Well, consider one big difference between elite schools (Princeton, NYU, etc.) and non-elite public or private institutions. Elite institutions typically have large departments and offer a wide variety of philosophy courses: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, logic, ethics, political philosophy, feminist philosophy, etc. In contrast, many non-elite institutions may only offer much narrower course offerings. Indeed, I know some undergraduate departments that don't really have any philosophy courses in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, or epistemology, offering primarily courses in ethics, political philosophy, continental philosophy, etc. Consequently, a good number of grad school applicants who might want to study metaphysics, philosophy of mind, or whatever, might not have the background to submit a good writing sample in that area–putting them at a disadvantage relative to a person from an elite institution who wants to focus in the same area. Further, if applicants' interests are significantly taken into account, there might be candidates who, at the time of applying, have no background experience or interest in a particular area (due to their previous educational experience) but who might (A) find out they enjoy and do fine work in that area, if only (B) they were admitted to a grad program that let them discover that and pursue that interest after admission.
This brings me to my second concern, which is more less about fairness and more about pedagogy. Perhaps I am just a sucker for exploration, but it has always struck me as a bit bizarre to think that grad school applicants should have settled philosophical interests before graduate school. Many new grad students have at most a few years of undergraduate or Masters level coursework–and while they may have some tentative areas of interest, a person's philosophical interests can change dramatically over time as they are exposed to new ideas, new fields, new mentors, and so on. Mine sure did! In my undergraduate studies at Tufts, I worked primarily on Wittgenstein and philosophy of mind and didn't have too much experience outside of those areas (I never studied Kant even once as an undergrad!). Then, when I enrolled in Syracuse's PhD program, I got into metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language–and wanted nothing to do with philosophy of mind anymore. Then, after transferring to Arizona, I found myself for the first time fascinated with ethics and political philosophy. To some observers, this might have looked like me flailing about without focus. To me, it was a wonderful–and critical–process of philosophical exploration in which I was able to develop a strong, broad philosophical background and make a well-informed (rather than premature) decision regarding my philosophical interests. It was absolutely wonderful. Indeed, I might even go so far to say–yes, a bit hyperbolically–that it was, at least in my experience, "everything a good education should be." The idea that I should have had a pretty firm set of philosophical interests prior to graduate school, and been admitted on the basis of those interests, seems exactly backwards to me–something that would have encouraged me to preemptively restrict my philosophical horizons at precisely the time when, as a young philosopher, one should be expanding one's horizons, not preemptively contracting them.
Anyway, these are just some of my thoughts. I don't mean to suggest that either of the above concerns obviously outweigh admissions committees' reasons for taking applicants' interests into account. After all, not taking candidates' interests into account might cause programs to be flooded with students all wanting to focus in the same area (i.e. entire crops of students wanting to study ethics), which for obvious reasons wouldn't be a viable situation. Still, I think it is worth bearing in mind the potential hidden costs of placing much weight on applicants' interests. Expecting candidates to have settled interests and good writing samples related to their area of stated interest may not only privilege candidates from elite schools, but also preempt the kind of philosophical exploration that, in my experience, can be critical to an excellent graduate education.
What do you think?
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