A couple of months ago, the first review of my book, Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory appeared at NDPR. Because I think books should speak for themselves, but think Rob Gressis is right that it could be helpful to clear up interpretive issues, I have decided that instead of penning a full response to my book's review, it might be best to let the text of Rightness as Fairness address the review itself.
Accordingly, in what follows below, I have chosen to simply juxtapose claims made in the book review against the actual text of my book (with one exception where I must paraphrase an argument spanning multiple chapters). For reasons of space, I cannot include every relevant passage from the book. However, I hope the passages I provide clear up some interpretive issues and encourage readers to examine the book more closely.
Before I begin, I would like to thank NDPR for commissioning the review, and Richard Dees for taking the time to engage with my work. While I think a few of his critiques have some merit–and thank him for some of the complimentary things he says about the book (e.g. that it has "some interesting insights" and "many inventive arguments")–there are some interpretive issues I would like to clarify.
NDPR Review: "Marcus Arvan sets an ambitious project for himself. Using constraints on theory construction modeled on the sciences, he formulates a new moral theory that is supposed to solve all the controversial issues that have always surrounded ethics."
What Rightness as Fairness says:
"This book does not purport to be the final word on morality. As with all theories, problems are sure to remain, and mistakes sure to be made. Yet, despite this, I will argue that it is a worthwhile new word on the subject – indeed, one that succeeds substantially where other theories founder." (p. 8, emphasis added for clarity; see also p. 229)
NDPR Review: "Leaning heavily on the claim that theories must have "Firm Foundations"…Arvan claims that only instrumentalism qualifies as a possible theory of normativity."
What Rightness as Fairness says:
"Before proceeding, I want clarify that I am not claiming that instrumentalism is the one true theory of normativity. Perhaps there are other kinds of normativity: categorical normativity12–16 , teleological normativity97 , and so on. All I am arguing is that instrumentalism is the safest place – the firmest foundation – to begin moral philosophy from, as it is a conception of normative rationality that is universally recognized." (p. 27, emphases added for clarity)
"Rather than presupposing that instrumentalism is the one true theory of normativity, I argue that insofar as it is the most widely accepted theory of normative rationality available – one commonly recognized both in everyday life and in the history of moral philosophy – it is the only starting point for moral philosophy that satisfies Firm Foundations and promises maximal explanatory power, unity, and parsimony." (p. 4, emphases added for clarity)
NDPR Review: If we grant [Arvan] the truth of [his moral principle] the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative, his next move is to note that to act on interests that satisfy our present selves and our future selves, we must take into account the fact that our future selves may come to identify with other people, alien races, and animals (118-28)…
But this move…goes too far. Why, exactly, I have to eliminate my own interests in a negotiation between my present interests and my future ones is a mystery…The bare possibility that I might have interests in others is not enough instrumentally to treat the interests of others as equal to my own. No matter what my future holds, for example, I will not be a black woman in the future, so it is simply false that from a prudential point of view, I should act like I might be. To make that claim, Arvan sneaks in a notion of fairness that simply is not a product of mere instrumental reasoning." (emphases added for clarity of focus)
What Rightness as Fairness says [my paraphrase]:
Across five chapters (Chapters 2-6), my book argues that,
- It is instrumentally rational
- In problem-of-possible-future-selves cases (isolated cases where we want to know our future interests – more on this below)
- To negotiate a fair balance
- Between your actual interests in the present, and
- The interests of all of your possible future selves
- Many of whom care about the interests of others (e.g. by empathy, self-interest, etc.)
- Including individuals of different races, genders, and species,
- Thereby making it rational to act on Four Principles of Fairness, including a principle of virtues of fairness that recursively requires one to become the kind of person who encounters and solves the problem of possible future selves in other cases.
In this way, my argument does:
- Not hold that, "I have to eliminate by interests" in the negotiation.
- Not hold that one must literally be (e.g.) a black woman in the future in order to have entirely instrumental reasons to treat her interests fairly.
- Not sneak in any notion of fairness not arrived at through fully instrumental reasoning (for reasons given below).
The point of my argument across Chapters 2-6 is that norms of fairness are an instrumentally rational solution to a very specific problem of diachronic rationality generated by isolated (but common) instances where we have specific motivational concerns about our future: a specific form of worrying about about future possibilities which I argue (using empirical evidence) that all normal human subjects sometimes have.
My account at no point appeals to formal constraints on diachronic rationality (viz. Korsgaard, Nagel, etc) or any non-instrumental norm of fairness.
Here is how:
Chapter 2 argues that we all sometimes face a problem of diachronic instrumental rationality called "the problem of possible future selves", isolated cases (including "non-moral cases") where we worry about the future and want to know our future interests before the future has happened.
[Note: see further down in this response for the evidence that Chapter 2 gives for these claims].
Chapter 3 then argues that the only instrumentally rational solution to this problem is for one's present and future selves to cooperate across time in conformity with the following principle:
"The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative: voluntarily aim for its own sake, in every relevant action, to best satisfy the motivational interests it is instrumentally rational for one’s present and every possible future self to universally agree upon given their voluntary, involuntary, and semivoluntary interests and co-recognition of the problem of possible future selves, where relevant actions are determined recursively as actions it is instrumentally rational for one’s present and possible future selves to universally agree upon as such when confronted by the problem – and then, when the future comes, voluntarily choose your having acted as such." (p. 76, italics added)
Chapter 4 then argues that this (instrumentally rational) principle's satisfaction conditions require taking your actual interests in the present, along with the interests of all other possible human and non-human creatures (regardless of race, gender, species, etc.), as all possibly your own interests–for some of the following reasons:
"The point in these cases is this: because of our ignorance of the future, in problem-cases we must recognize that there are many possible ways in which – literally or by proxy – we can come to identify our interests with those of other human beings. However, the qualification here, ‘by proxy,’ is important. Although some of one’s possible future selves might literally identify their interests with the interests of others (as when we feel others’ pain as though they are our own, wanting to not hurt them because we experience their pain ‘as our own’), in many cases the relevant identification is by proxy: by the person coming to align their interests the interests of others…" (p. 122)
"[For instance], last Spring I watched a public screening documentary film on the plight of migrant workers, which was then discussed by one of the filmmakers, a migrant worker. Here again I found myself moved. I found myself caring not only about migrant farm workers in general – identifying my interests with theirs, resolving to do something to help their cause – I also found myself identifying my interests with those of particular workers, experiencing some of their hopes and suffering by proxy, almost as though they were my own (though of course I cannot come close to truly experiencing the full extent of their experiences.). Finally, consider perhaps an even more surprising example. A television series, Catfish, follows real-life stories of people who have been deceived or otherwise harmed by individuals assuming false identities on the Internet. A recent episode told the story of ‘Falesha,’ a young woman who had her online identity stolen at the age of 15. Over a period of several years, a woman calling herself ‘Jacqueline Linkwood’ used publicly available photos of Falesha to create a false Facebook profile in which she routinely made vulgar comments and conducted personal attacks on complete strangers. ‘Jacqueline’ eventually progressed to full-on online identity theft, creating a false Facebook profile in Falesha’s name (still using her pictures), ‘friend-requesting’ individuals from Falesha’s school and community, and proceeding to harass them. As a result, Falesha was ostracized and mistreated by many of her classmates who believed that she was bullying them online. On one episode of Catfish, however, series producers were able to track down ‘Jacqueline,’ and brought Falesha to her house to confront her. Although Falesha was expecting to experience anger prior to the meeting (and even worried about having a physical confrontation), after the meeting she admitted that she ‘wanted to cry’ out of pity for the young woman, who clearly displayed troubling signs of mental illness – identifying with her perpetrator’s suffering in an entirely unexpected way." (pp. 119-20, emphases added)
Chapter 5 then argues that the satisfaction-conditions of the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative as such–an instrumentally rational principle which requires treating your actual interests and the interests of others as possibly your own–can be modeled by a 'Moral Original Position' similar to Rawls original position, but dropping a number of his assumptions.
Chapter 6 then argues that it is instrumentally rational for anyone in the Moral Original Position to agree to act on Four Principles of Fairness, one of which is Principle of Fair Negotiation between one's own interests and the interests of others, and another of which (the Principle of Virtues of Fairness) require one to become the kind of person who encounters and solves the problem of possible future selves (in the above manner) when and only when fairness requires it (thus delineating morality's limits recursively from within).
In summation, instrumental rationality, and instrumental rationality alone–applied to a particular problem of diachronic rationality generated by a specific set motivational interests had by all normal human subjects–can be used to establish the rationality of strong norms of fairness. The book then goes on to argue that this solution satisfies seven truth-apt principles of theory-selection better than alternative theories.
NDPR Review: "Nevertheless, Arvan takes the actual negotiation clause very seriously, citing it as one of the great advantages of his view…[However], [Arvan] somehow misses the fact that the most contentious debates — those about abortion, women's rights, LGBTQI rights, and even about welfare rights — are mostly about what is required to treat people equally and without coercion. On his grounds, then, these debates are not ones open to negotiations, but he thereby undermines the centrality of actual negotiations that are the hallmark of his theory."
What Rightness as Fairness says:
"Rightness as Fairness therefore entails a doctrine we might call ‘Libertarian Egalitarian Communitarianism.’ According to this doctrine, people in any political domain are required to:
- Have and pursue a quasi-libertarian preference for coercion-avoidance and minimization as a common ideal (negative fairness).
- Have and pursue a quasi-egalitarian preference for assisting others who would benefit and desire assistance as a common ideal (positive fairness).
- Negotiate, through social and political processes that approximate equal bargaining power, how these ideals are to be weighed against one another, and against other costs, including communitarian concerns.
"[Insofar as] Rightness as Fairness also holds (in the Principle of Fair Negotiation) that morality requires people who share ideals of negative and positive fairness to negotiate with one another, it entails that some forms of divisiveness – namely (A) unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of arguments based on those ideals, and (B) unwillingness to negotiate fairly with people who share those ideals – are immoral.
…Consider again debates over abortion. Both sides can plausibly point to the Principles of Negative and Positive Fairness in support of their position. Anti-abortion advocates want to protect fetuses from coercion (namely, death as a result of abortion). Pro-abortion advocates, however, argue that disallowing abortion would be coercive to women (since it would coerce them into carrying a child to term against their will). While Rightness as Fairness does not require either side to accept the other side’s overall position – since, on Rightness as Fairness, ‘coercion conflicts’ cannot be settled on principle – it does require both sides to (A) recognize the moral legitimacy of the values appealed to (protection of sentient fetuses and women from coercion), and (B) be willing to determine an answer through a fair political process. It allows, in other words, for moral disagreement (for both sides to keep advocating for their favored balance of negative and positive fairness against costs), while at the same time requiring both sides to accept the legitimacy of a fair political process to arrive at social policy." (p. 213)
NDPR Review: "Arvan tries to derive morality from instrumentalism by appealing to our uncertainty about our own futures. We cannot know the best means to our ends because we do not know how things will turn out…The best we can do is to make probabilistic calculations, but such calculations only work on likely outcomes. But, [Arvan] claims, we want more than a bet; we want to know the results, so we need to consider every possible outcome…Yet even if all [of Arvan's arguments] were sound, the account Arvan gives [here] depends not on uncontroversial claims about instrumental rationality, but on controversial assertions about how we should think about the relationship between our present selves and all our possible future selves and about how we should reason about them. His view simply falls well outside of our common understanding of instrumental rationality, and so it violates the Firm Foundations requirement in exactly the way he claims other moral theories do." (emphases added for clarity)
What Rightness as Fairness says:
"[T]he problem of possible future selves is that, all too often – when we are uncertain about what to do, or we are tempted to violate moral norms – we want to know the interests of our future selves." (p. 4)
"Section 2 then argues that we face a systematic problem in life. We typically care about our future, including about the interests of our future selves…Further, in some cases, we do not merely want our future selves to probably be satisfied with our decisions: we want to know whether they will be satisfied with them." (p. 42, emphases added for clarity)
"Some readers might suggest that we always have some such interests – that is, that in some sense, we always care, at least implicitly, about our past and future. And to a certain extent this seems plausible…Still, as plausible as this seems, we should not assume it. As Chapter 1 argued, this book aims to respect Firm Foundations: the principle which states that theories should be based on obviously true observations. Consequently…we should not assume that we always care about the past or future. The fact that we sometimes do care will suffice for our purposes." (p. 45, emphases added for clarity)
"Notice, next, that we do not need to beg any controversial metaphysical questions about personal identity…For instrumentalism merely concerns our interests, analyzing what we ought to do in terms of what we care about. Since, whatever the truth about personal identity may or may not be, our present ‘selves’ care about their past and future ‘selves,’ we have all the material we need to make instrumental arguments. For, whatever the truth about personal identity may be, this ‘self’ – my present one – has interests regarding ‘his’ past and future ‘selves.’ (p. 45)
"We all repeatedly face a particular problem in life: each and every one of us tends to care about our future, yet we lack knowledge of what the future holds. There is no denying this…In some cases, it is simply a bit annoying: I want my day to go well today, but I cannot ensure that it will (yesterday, for instance, was full of frustrations and obstacles, despite my best efforts!). In other cases, however, our inability to know the future literally keeps us up at night. Indeed, when it comes to important, potentially ‘life-changing’ decisions – such as whether to buy a new home, or take a new job, and so on – our desire to know the future can lead to agony. We want to know whether buying the home will be a good investment, whether we will be happy or miserable in a different job, and so on." (p. 47)
"We often encounter this problem in ‘moral’ cases…" (p. 48)
"This is the problem of possible future selves. In many cases in life, our concerns about possible – even if unlikely – outcomes (the mere possibility of our home getting foreclosed on, the possibility that we will get caught cheating on an exam, and so on), lead us to desperately want to know the future, so that we do not ‘have to put our future in jeopardy’… (p. 50)
"The problem of possible future selves laid out above is not merely an ‘academic’ problem. It is one that sometimes quite literally keeps us up at night. When we have momentous decisions to make (about buying a home, or changing careers, or telling a dangerous lie), we often find ourselves wanting to know the future…" (p. 64)
"In summation, although we may or may not always care about our future…there are clearly significant numbers of cases in our lives where we have strong, indeed overwhelming, interests in:
A. Knowing our future interests …
B. Knowing how to order our present and future interests, and
C. Acting in ways sure to satisfy those interests, without merely 'betting’ on our probable future interests…" (p. 51, emphases added)
"[I]nsofar as we all encounter the problem of possible future selves from time to time – not necessarily in exam-cheating cases, but in cases as simple as wanting to know whether one will be happy with buying a home – the rationality of obeying the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative in those cases makes it instrumentally rational, in a recursive fashion, to become the kind of person who encounters and solves the problem of possible selves…in other cases as well (namely, the kinds of cases we ordinarily recognize as ‘moral decisions’)…[Thus,] even though we may ‘come to the table,’ as it were, only worrying about the future in some cases…I will argue that the rational solution to those cases…makes it instrumentally rational to have the very worries that give rise to the problem in other cases…as well. We can, as it were, normatively ‘bootstrap’ morality as a whole out of isolated, even ‘nonmoral’ cases in which we encounter the problem of possible future selves.' (p. 94, emphases added)
"Rightness as Fairness coheres with a variety of empirical observations and experiments linking moral responsibility to capacities for mental time travel and concern for one’s future. Indeed, just as Rightness as Fairness predicts (since it founds the rationality of morality on our future-directed interests), failure to be concerned for one’s future has been demonstrated to be a strong predictor of immoral behavior.1–4 (p. 219, emphases added)
"…These facts will prove to be prescient. For as we saw in Chapter 1, two things that a good moral theory should do is cohere with known facts (external coherence) and provide unified explanations of things that lack good explanations (explanatory power, unity, and fruitfulness). As we will see in this and future chapters, this book will provide a unified explanation of precisely why nonhuman animals, children, teenagers, and psychopaths fail to appreciate the normative force of moral norms. They fail to appreciate the normative force of moral norms because…[they] lack the kinds of interests that give rise to the problem of possible future selves: the problem for which morality (or so I will argue) is an instrumentally rational solution. (pp. 46-7, emphases added)
NDPR Review: "...Arvan simply assumes without argument that we must take a prudential care of our future selves, an assumption that Derek Parfit nimbly shows we should not take for granted.'
What Rightness as Fairness says:
"…as I argued in Chapter 1, we should not consider it the job of moral philosophy to cohere with preconceptions about what morality ‘should be,’ [or what "reasons" we have for acting] any more than we should think it is the job of physics to conform to pre-theoretic prejudices about space and time. Moral philosophy should be based on Firm Foundations – on observational facts attested to by virtually everyone – and we should follow those foundations where they lead." (p. 67, emphasis added)
"We are now in a position to evaluate Rightness as Fairness using the seven principles of theory selection…We have seen that Rightness as Fairness satisfies Firm Foundations extremely well. First, as we saw in Chapter 1, Rightness as Fairness is based on an instrumental conception of normative rationality that virtually all human beings – people of all ages, cultures, mental faculties, and moral sensibilities (even criminals and psychopaths) – recognize and accept. Second, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, Rightness as Fairness is based on observable motivational interests about the past, present, and future that all paradigmatic moral agents – normal, nonpsychopathic adult human beings – possess. Further, as we saw in Chapters 2–4, Rightness as Fairness coheres with a variety of empirical observations and experiments linking moral responsibility to capacities for mental time travel and concern for one’s future.
In contrast, as we saw in Chapter 1, other predominant approaches to moral philosophy…fare less favorably on Firm Foundations, as such views tend to be based on controversial premises that are denied by their critics…[For example], Parfit’s…non-naturalist, realist theory of reasons is problematic vis-à-vis Firm Foundations…within philosophy, a significant number of critics argue that both normative non-naturalism and reasons fundamentalism are false.9–11" (pp. 218-9)
"Rightness as Fairness [also] has advantages in external coherence over Parfit’s [non-naturalist theory] in the above ways. First, insofar as it is not based on claims about mental time travel or concern for one’s future, Parfit’s theory does not predict or explain above list of empirical observations linking moral responsibility to ‘mental time travel’ and concern for one’s future." (p. 223)
"Rightness as Fairness also has advantages on the principle of Explanatory Power over rival theories...[W]hereas Parfit takes normative reasons as basic and unexplainable, Rightness as Fairness explains normativity in terms of our interests and concept of instrumental normative rationality. Second, because Parfit’s theory is based on nonnaturalistic claims about reasons, his theory does not predict or explain the empirical observations (concerning the relationships between moral responsibility, future-concernedness, ‘mental time travel,’ and so on) that Rightness as Fairness does…" (pp. 224-5)
"Rightness as Fairness also has advantages over rival theories on the principle of Parsimony. First, whereas ‘realist’ moral theories – intuitionistic theories42 , as well as Parfit’s [theory of reasons] – invoke a realm of ‘non-natural moral facts,’… Rightness as Fairness bases morality on observable human interests and our instrumental conception of normative rationality – the latter of which, as I suggested in Chapter 1 and others have also argued43, can reduce normativity to non-normative/empirical facts…' (pp. 226-7)
"Rightness as Fairness also has advantages on the principle of Unity over competing theories [including Parfit's theory]." (p. 226)
"Finally, Rightness as Fairness has advantages over competing moral theories on the principle of Fruitfulness [including Parfit's non-naturalist theory]." (p. 227)
NDPR Review: "Arvan … proposes that we get out of the problem of future selves by appealing to what he calls the "Categorical-Instrumental Imperative"…This first crucial move in the argument, however, is based on bad math…But even if Arvan were correct in the first part of the calculation, the conclusion still would not follow: it is simply false that positive infinity plus negative infinity is zero. Mathematically, the answer is indeterminate.[1] So the argument for rejecting standard probabilistic means-end reasoning is simply mistaken."
The subsequent argument that moral actions have infinite worth because the expected value of the infinite possibilities is infinite is similarly wrong-headed. Even if all the other results of our choices did magically added up to zero, the result of the sum would be the value of the moral action.[2] In this case, I think, nothing important hangs on the mistake, but it shows how the reasoning in Arvan's account is faulty." (my emphases)
What Rightness as Fairness says:
"We are now in a position to establish the instrumental rationality of obeying the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative. We saw, in Chapter 2, that we encounter the problem of possible future selves when our present selves are uncertain about the future, wanting to know our future interests and order them with our present ones. We have now [already] seen, in this chapter, that there is one – and only one – way for our present selves to do so. We can know our future interests, and order them with our present interests, if and only if our future selves cooperate with us to arrive at a set of mutually agreed upon interests for both (present and future selves) to voluntarily pursue for their own sake: for, if our present and future selves agree to some such interests and voluntarily uphold them, then there is no possible way one can fail to know, or satisfy, those agreed upon interests." (pp. 91-2)
Although the argument just given for this principle is complex, it can be simplified as follows: in cases where one wants to know one’s future interests (call them ‘problem-cases’), one’s present and future selves necessarily share an interest in solving the problem, and it can only be solved if both voluntarily commit themselves to acting in ways that one’s present and every possible future self could universally agree to, given their other interests and co-recognition of the inability of one’s present self to know which future self will be actual. Since this argument is still complex at present, I believe we can explicate it further and make its complexities more intuitive by carefully examining a specific instance utilizing causal decision theory…" (p. 93)
"Given the argument above, some readers might wonder how moral behavior solves the problem of possible future selves. After all, isn’t it true that we can draw up the same result for moral behavior in problem cases: that since there is an infinite number of possible ways that moral behavior can benefit a person, and an infinite number of ways in can backfire, the total expected utility of moral behavior in problem-cases is zero as well (as illustrated in Table 3.2)?…" (pp. 100-1)
While this concern is understandable, it actually enables us to see more clearly why, although immoral behavior can be tempting even in problem-cases, properly understood moral behavior has greater expected utility in such cases: indeed, infinitely greater expected utility. Notice that Tables 3.1 and 3.2 both analyze expected outcomes in terms of things external to the action itself…But according to the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative, this is fundamentally the wrong way to respond to problem-cases, and by extension, the wrong way to understand the expected benefits of moral behavior.
The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative states that the only rational way to solve the problem of possible future selves is come to an agreement with all of our possible future selves on interests to pursue for their own sake…If this is correct, then the right way to frame moral behavior in a decision-theoretic framework is not as illustrated in Table 3.2. One must instead represent outcomes in terms of the dominant, voluntary interests of each possible future self: who, by obeying the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative, make their dominant interest pursuing fairness for its own sake, as its own reward. If this is correct…then the correct representation of the expected benefits of moral behavior is Table 3.3. Since each possible future self in this case has the same intrinsic, voluntarily chosen end – not cheating for its own sake – then there is no possible way for any of the selves to fail to satisfy their dominant end. Instead, there is an infinite number of possible future selves, all of whom are assured to satisfy their dominant end: fairness for its own sake. And in that case the total expected outcome of the action of not cheating is +infinity…" (pp. 101-2).
"[In this way], the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative does more than validate Immanuel Kant’s famous assertion that the only thing that could be good without limitation is a ‘good will’ – a will that conforms to the moral law for its own sake.18 It also synthesizes two claims about infinity that Kant set against one another in the following famous passages concluding the Critique of Practical Reason:
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the oftener and the more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me … The first begins from the place I occupy in the external world of sense and extends the connection in which I stand into an unbounded magnitude with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, and moreover into the unbounded times of their periodic motion, their beginning and their duration. The second begins from my invisible self, my personality, and presents me in a world which has true infinity but which can be discovered only by the understanding, and I cognize that my connection with that world (and thereby with all those visible worlds as well) is not merely contingent, as in the first case, but universal and necessary. The first view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an animal creature, which after it has been for a short time provided with vital force (one knows not how) must give back to the planet (a mere speck in the universe) the matter from which it came. The second, on the contrary, infinitely raises my worth as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world, at least so far as this may be inferred from the purposive determination of my existence by this law, a determination not restricted to conditions and boundaries of this life but reaching into the infinite.19
This has been exactly my argument. It is our infinite ‘smallness’ in the present, the fact that our future could go an infinite number of ways, that makes morality infinitely valuable: it is only by reaching out to all of our possible future selves, and coming to a universal agreement on interests to pursue for their own sake, that we bridge the infinite gulf between us and them. However, there are a number of critical differences between my argument and Kant’s, which – I believe – firmly favor mine over his…" (pp. 106-7)
References
Arvan, Marcus (2016). Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory (London: Palgrave MacMillan).
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