While discussing a theory which is well-known in Europe and in the Anglophone world in comparison to (one or the other theory within) another philosophical traditions, say, premodern Indian philosophy, one can be faced with two alternatives: Either the theory is easily recognisable also in premodern Indian philosophy or it appears to be completely missing (with many steps in between).

Both cases involve risks. In the first case, one may be driven away by the easiness of the comparison and overwrite the Indian theory with one's own, more familiar one. This is a risk one runs when, for instance, discussing theology in an Indian setting, if one does not question whether God could mean something different in both contexts. The other case is also risky, since it leads one to a difficult situation. The clue to the answer is asking what is really meant by the question at stake.

For instance, let us suppose that one is investigating the topic of free will and wishes to compare what has been written about it in Europe and in the Anglophone world and in premodern India. Free will has been debated in thousands or millions of titles in Europe and America but not a single monograph is dedicated to this topic alone in premodern India. Here, one needs to think what exactly is meant by the question, so as to approach it, so to say, from the side. One will therefore notice that the question about free will arises out of a contrast, be it between one's will and God's one or between one's will and neuroscience data about the process of decision making. Having taken notice of that, one will realise that the topic of free will can be found in theistic traditions (and in fact it is discussed in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta), but not in monist ones. In this way, therefore, one understands both why a given topic is dealt with and why it is not.

This also leads me to one of the advantages of a comparative approach: At the very least, it enables you to gain clarity and become better aware of the complexities hidden in each given topic.

Did you ever understand X better through comparing it with the approach to X of a different tradition? How did it happen?

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2 responses to “Methodological problem: How to reconstruct a (missing) theory in comparative philosophy”

  1. Brad

    This is an interesting issue. A central part of Feyerabend’s methodology involved a commitment to comparative theory evaluation. He claimed you see aspects of theories that you do not otherwise see (or easily see) when you make a comparative evaluation. This is part of the reason he thought that even outlandish theories are valuable. They can aid in comparative evaluations. I am writing on this now. If you are interested I would gladly share a paper with you.

  2. Many thanks, Brad, that would be very valuable. You can contact me via Academia.edu or drop me an email (just google my name together with IKGA).

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