Two posts I read this morning got me thinking about our discipline's priorities: Eric Schwitzgabel's post at NewAPPS on how no philosophers have won MacArthur "genius" fellowships since 1993, and "Professor Manners"'s post on whether we should emulate Socrates over at Feminist Philosophers.
By and large, philosophy seems to be hurting. At many universities, philosophy is more or less an afterthought. Departments tend to be small, and jobs and majors tend to be increasingly scarce. For example, at my university, the Department of Philosophy & Religion is the single smallest department at the University, with (I believe) the second-fewest majors.
Why is our discipline so marginalized? I think that to anyone who has been in the game for any amount of time, the answer is plain. People tend to think philosophy is "useless." Students tend to think this, parents tend to think it, administrators tend to think it, and of course, some very visible scientists make it publicly clear that they think it. Now, of course, some philosophy departments — mostly, those at R1 universities, particularly Leiter-ranked programs — are doing quite well. But, for the most part, these universities are the exception, not the rule. The rule, in today's day and age — where student tuition and state and donor funding determine how universities distribute their resources — is that philosophy is being increasingly relegated to the margins.
Which begs the question: what should be done? If we want philosophy to survive and to flourish, what strategies should our discipline pursue? The answer, I think, is plain:
- We need to make philosophy more relevant to people outside of our discipline, and
- Since people outside of philosophy tend to care about what is "useful", we need to make philosophy "useful."
Which brings to me to Socrates and mathematics. I have raised worries about some elements of Socrates' approach to philosophy before, suggesting that it is too rationalistic and out of touch with human experience. On the flip-side, however, another element of Socrates' approach to philosophy – his manner of engaging with the concerns and interests of everyday people – is one that not only interested people in his time (so much so, of course, that he was executed!); it is also an approach that has kept people (i.e. our undergrads) interested people ever since. Socrates was not working in an "ivory tower", or focusing on minutae of interest to only a select few. He was meeting the public on issues of interest to them, and in ways members of the public could understand and grapple with.
The basic idea here — that philosophy should prioritize engaging the public on matters they care about — seems to me to make a good deal of sense in a world like ours: a world where departmental funding (and jobs) tend to depend on tuition, state funding, and donors, To my knowledge, many other disciplines have long recognized this. In mathematics, it is recognized that departments must prioritize applied mathematics — stuff that attracts investment from aerospace, computer science, and other industries – so that they have resources to pursue pure, theoretical mathematics. Similarly, in physics, it seems widely recognized that departments must prioritize applied physics — again, things that attract investment (particle colliders, etc.) – so that they can do pure, "phenomeonological" physics (i.e. string theory, etc.).
Professional philosophy, on the other hand, seems to me to have largely pursued the opposite tack. The discipline has tended to prioritize "the core" – metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language (in other words, the most abstract, "pure" areas of philosophy) — while relegating more applied areas (applied ethics, feminist philosophy, critical race theory) to the background. The most common argument that I have come across for having these priorities (one I have come across on a few blogs) is that the "core" areas are more important, more philosophical, or more rigorous than the others. But now let us think about this a bit. Even if this kind of argument is correct (which I doubt, but whatever), is prioritizing the "core" a good strategy for our discipline?
I think there are many reasons to believe the answer is "no." Just as applied mathematics brings in money so that people can do pure mathematics, there are many reasons to believe that applied philosophy — particularly, philosophy that engages interests and concerns of diverse bodies of people — is more likely to attract more resources than the "core"…so that more people can do philosophy…including core areas. The reasons, I think, are right there in front of us: applied philosophy, like applied mathematics and applied physics, has applications that people outside of philosophy are likely to want to invest in. Businesses, hospitals, medical and nursing programs, etc., all have interests in education in ethical education. And, as many recent events (in Ferguson, MO, domestic violence, etc., to name just a few) suggest, large segments of society have strong interests in better understanding racial and gender issues. These are the kinds of philosophical issues that matter to people outside of philosophy. And so, it seems to me, that if we want philosophy to thrive — all of it, including the "core" — these areas should be our priority.
Indeed, there's a common saying: "Don't make the perfect the enemy of the good." Even if the "core" areas are philosophy's most important areas (which is something we can disagree about), the best way to "defend the core" just might be to prioritize applied philosophy more than we have. Consider, for instance, just how much public attention (and funding!) L.A. Paul's recent work on decision theory and child-bearing. Philosophy can be done in a way that interests the public…so, shouldn't we be doing more of it?
What say you?
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