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Is it problematic to use the same argument to defend different theses in different papers?

In our August “how can we help you?” thread, a reader asks:

Is it self-plagiarism or otherwise unethical to send out for publication two different pieces, to two different journals, if they argue for different theses in different subfields, but both use the same underlying bit of reasoning to justify their conclusion? That is, the key move, the “ace-in-the-hole” argument that does the most justificatory work, is the same in both of them?

I guess I think it’s sort of hard to say without seeing the actual papers–as (I think) I can imagine cases like this that aren’t problematic but also cases that may be (e.g., cases where two papers are basically the same but with minor differences in conclusions defended). These latter types of cases might run afoul of journal policies that papers must not be under review elsewhere, or alternatively (if one paper ends up being published before the other), journal policies that prohibit submitting a paper that contains a significant amount of content that has already been published.

What do readers think?

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9 responses to “Is it problematic to use the same argument to defend different theses in different papers?”

  1. Corvus splendens

    Agree with Marcus; this is going to be difficult to adjudicate without knowing quite a lot more about the papers.

    One practical thought – if OP falls under Marcus’s second case – is that you try to do both in the same paper, showing how the same pattern of reasoning has interesting results in two disparate places. But I can also imagine that being a nightmare both to write and get through review.

    Reply
  2. Anonymous

    I had several professors in grad school whose publications mainly consisted of repeating the same argument in different ways and in different applications. I can’t see a problem with it. In whichever one comes out second, cite the one that came out first. In the manuscripts for review you could say something like, “In another paper [reference redacted for blinding], I argue….”

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    1. Anonymous

      I can second this. A few philosophers come to mind who seem to spend a few years at a time celebrating the same idea in various different kinds of publications.

      Reply
      1. Anonymous

        I third this. There are a few philosophy books by famous philosophers that show how arguments they previously published can be applied to other issues, problems, etc. I agree with the previous post that, as long as they properly cite, there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong with doing this.

  3. Anonymous

    All things being equal (which of course they never are), if I were on a hiring committee and I saw an applicant who had done that, I would not consider them further.

    Reply
  4. Anonymous

    As others have pointed out, the trick is to cite properly. But if you attribute correctly, then the second paper would look much thinner, given that the main argument already belongs to another paper. If you paraphrase in bulk without making it clear that it belongs to another paper, then it is not okay for peer-reviewed journals, though sometimes it happens. BTW, publication/review norms are always evolving, and data from 30 years ago do not necessarily apply now.

    Reply
  5. Michel

    I think readers are missing that it’s the same core argument for two different theses in different subfields. It’s like using an evolutionary debunking argument for moral truths in one paper, and mathematical truths in another.

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  6. Anonymous

    I don’t see why a paper would be “thinner” even if the core argument is used to show two different theses in two different subfeilds. Imagine a drug was helpful at treating very different diseases, or a mathematical technique was helpful at proving different theorems in different subfeilds. Both of these seem to be worthwhile and could be extremely significant. Indeed, many systematic thinkers in philosophy argued this way. Hume, for example, used similar empiricist arguments against personal identity, the self, substance, and causation. If anything, this makes his arguments more significant, not less.

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  7. dazesensationallye39c0dc2cd

    Original OP here. Thanks so much for all your comments, every one of which was helpful and will inform what I do. And Michel, FYI, your analogy perfectly fits what I have in mind.

    Reply

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